Malpractice reforms tend to reduce physician liability for harming patients. Because these reforms are passed at the state level, the costs of harming patients vary widely by geographic location. In this paper, I test whether malpractice reforms affect where physicians choose to practice and whether physicians who relocate in response to reforms are particularly prone to commit malpractice. Because a state's own reforms can not separately identify moral hazard from adverse selection and because those reforms are likely to have direct impacts on measures of malpractice via the legal market, I focus attention on neighboring states' reforms. I find that when a state's neighbor passes a cap on noneconomic damages, both the physician to population ratio and the malpractice rate fall. This suggests that physicians who relocate in response to noneconomic damages caps are more likely to commit malpractice. * I would like to thank
Medical malpractice reform has been the subject of both public and academic debate since the 1970s. The American Medical Association portrays the liability system as arbitrary and physicians as constantly subjected to frivolous lawsuits. The American Association for Justice, the largest association of plaintiffs' counsel, portrays physicians as more dangerous than auto accidents or guns. Between 1970 and 2001, 45 of the 48 contiguous states in the U.S. passed at least one medical malpractice reform. In principal, reforms reduce physician liability (malpractice pressure) by limiting the probability of having to pay a malpractice claim and by censoring the right tail of the award distribution. The empirical evidence on the link between malpractice pressure and costs is somewhat mixed (e.g. Baicker and Chandra 2005b, Mello 2006 ), but Avraham (2007) found that reforms are associated with a 10 percent to 13 percent drop in the number of paid claims per doctor and Danzon (1986) found a 20 percent drop in the dollar value of the payment with reforms.
1 These changes suggest that reforms might reduce physicians' expected malpractice costs considerably.
Is this necessarily a good thing? The reduction in malpractice costs will likely attract physicians, but will it attract physicians that the state wants? Figure 1 shows that of physicians who had at least one paid malpractice claim between 1990 and 2002, the distribution of paid malpractice claims is extremely skewed. Physicians in the bottom percentile paid 9.2 malpractice claims over the 13 year period while physicians from the 32nd percentile and up paid only one malpractice claim over the same period. Paid malpractice claims is one measure of actual malpractice that is likely to be positively correlated with the true, unobservable amount of malpractice.
2 Even if only a handful of physicians move in response to malpractice reforms, they might have large effects on the aggregate amount of malpractice in their area. This opens up the possibility that adverse selection is serious issue in the context of medical malpractice reform.
Simply regressing paid claims per doctor on measures of a state's reform status is problematic for a number of reasons. First, reforms affect not only physician behavior (probability of committing malpractice) and sorting (practicing in areas with favorable malpractice laws), but also patients' decisions about filing malpractice claims. For a given amount of actual malpractice committed, fewer claims will be filed when reforms are put into place because those reforms reduce the expected payout of a claim. This will tend to cause a negative bias in a regression of paid claims per doctor on state's reforms. Second, this regression would not be able to separate out the moral hazard from adverse selection impacts. In principal, reducing a physician's liability for malpractice might reduce the costly effort that physicians must exert in order for their care to be above the malpractice threshold. Evidence on this behavioral impact is mixed. A series of papers on defensive medicine by Daniel Kessler and Mark McClellan argue that physicians over-provide medical care out of fear of legal liability (Kessler and McClellan 1996 , Kessler and McClellan 2002a , Kessler and McClellan 2002b .
Empirically, they find that reducing physician liability reduces the use of medical care and that there is no corresponding increase in deaths. However, Currie and MacLeod (2008) find that reductions in liability are associated with increases in preventable adverse outcomes and Iizuka (2013) finds that reforms increase preventable medical complications.
Instead of simply regressing paid claims per doctor on a state's reform status, I use reforms passed by adjacent states. As an example, consider Illinois, Indiana, and California.
The costs of moving a medical practice to Indiana from Illinois are lower than from California. When Indiana passes a malpractice reform, physicians in Illinois will be more likely to relocate their practice to Indiana than physicians from California. For physicians who practice near the Illinois-Indiana border, they might not even have to move their residence, just their practice. If the physicians who stop practicing in Illinois are more likely to commit malpractice than the average doctor in Illinois, Illinois's malpractice rate will fall. In Illinois,
neither the incentives to commit malpractice (moral hazard) nor the incentives to file a claim have been altered by Indiana's reform-only the composition of physicians changed. Thus any change in the malpractice rate observed when Indiana passes a reform can be attributed to adverse or positive selection induced by the reform. Burghardt Jr. (1978) noticed that states that passed malpractice reforms tended to be states whose supply of physicians was growing more slowly; Danzon (2000) suggests that in recent years, states that adopted medical malpractice reforms may be those that adopted managed care to a greater degree;
and Malani and Reif (2012) treat malpractice reforms as exogenous, but allow physicians to have anticipated the reforms and reacted to them prior to enactment.
3 Although the primary motivation for using neighboring states' reforms is to provide a basis for the following analysis of malpractice rates, a lesser motivation is that a neighboring state's reform is likely to provide a less biased estimate of the impact of reforms on physician supply. It relies on a strong link between paid malpractice claims and deaths due to malpractice as well as a rough estimate of the rate of malpractice deaths per hospital discharge. In addition, if the extra physicians who moved to a state and commit malpractice also prevent a number of deaths from happening (because of the increased supply of physicians in the state), then the 311 figure clearly overstates the true change in deaths as a result of adverse selection.
However, if true, the increased deaths due to malpractice would be comparable in magnitude to the number of homicides in the average state each year.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Background information on medical malpractice reforms is given in Section 1. Section 2 briefly describes the data. Section 3 bias implied for neighboring state's reforms in the same regression.
describes the empirical strategy for the migration analysis. Section 4 reports the effects of neighbors' malpractice reforms on physician location. Section 5 describes the empirical strategy for the adverse selection analysis. Section 6 analyzes the adverse selection results.
Section 7 discusses the implications and concludes.
Background
Medical malpractice laws are passed at each state's discretion. There have been no federal interventions. Because of this, there is considerable variation both across states and over time in the amount of protection that states offer physicians.
5 Figure 3 maps the number of malpractice reforms in each state in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 The tort reforms used in this analysis are those passed most frequently by states and are largely aimed at reducing the payments physicians have to make. The reforms are:
• Cap on noneconomic damages: Noneconomic damages are awarded for non-monetary or quality of life losses, pain, and suffering. The cap limits the amount that will be paid to the plaintiff.
• Cap on punitive damages: Punitive damages are awarded to punish defendants.
• Cap on total damages: This cap limits the total dollar value of the award for all types of damages (economic, noneconomic, and punitive).
• Joint and several liability reform: In cases with multiple defendants, the reform of this common law rule stipulates that a defendant must have caused a large fraction of the 5 For reviews of the history of medical malpractice and reforms, see Sage (2006) and Kersh (2006) . damages before she is responsible for paying the full amount of the damages awarded.
The threshold required varies.
• Collateral source rule reform: The collateral source rule is another common law rule that bars using payments that the plaintiff received from other sources as evidence in court. The reform allows the payments to be admitted as evidence at the trial. Because patients are able to travel to receive medical care, one might be concerned that a physician who relocates a short distance (just to the other side of the border) and sees some of her patients from her old location might be subject to the malpractice environment in the state she left. Symeonides (2006) and Symeonides (2008) show that in cases where the plaintiff traveled to another state for medical care, courts have applied the malpractice law of the state where the malpractice occurred, not the state in which the plaintiff resides.
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Thus, by moving their practices to new locations, physicians are able to take advantage of different legal environments.
Data
The majority of the data come from the 1993, There are at least three separate codings of malpractice reforms that have been used recently. Kessler and McClellan (1996) popularized the distinction between direct and indirect reforms. In this coding, they collapse all damages caps, no mandatory prejudgment interest, and collateral-source-rule reforms into a single indicator and combine joint and caps on contingency fees, mandatory periodic payments, joint-and-several liability, and patient compensation funds into another. Although this approach has the benefit of adding few variables to the model, it forces any reform within each category to have the same impact (and no impact conditional on one of the other reforms being in place). The coding used by Currie and MacLeod (2008) Thus, I define neighbors to be counties in different states that share a common border.
The regression specification is
where i indexes the county, t indexes the year, X is a vector of variables indicating the reform status of the neighboring counties, C is a vector of control variables, λ t is a set of year fixed effects, and λ c is a set of county fixed effects. The variables in C include controls for population, per capita income, race, age, and urban status. These variables are included for county i as well as its neighbors. The main coefficients of interest are the β 1 s because they indicate whether the number of physicians in county i decreases when a neighboring county's state passes a malpractice reform. When neighbors are defined as counties that share a border, the X variables are a constant for counties on the interior of a state and so would not help to identify β 1 . When a county has multiple neighbors in other states, population weighted averages of the reform status of those counties are used. Thus, the X variables lie between zero and one. As the variable approaches one, a larger fraction of the adjacent counties in other states have the particular reform in place. A state's own reforms are excluded initially in equation (1) due to the endogeneity concerns, but their impact is assessed as part of the sensitivity analysis.
Standard errors are clustered by both adjacent state and own state using the multiway clustering procedure described in Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2010) . It accounts for arbitrary autocorrelation for counties within a state as well as within a group of counties that all border a given state. Additionally, it adjusts the standard errors for the fact that malpractice reforms are passed at the state, not county, level (Moulton 1990 ).
Physician Migration Results
Column (1) of Table 3 reports estimates of equation (1). Only caps on neighbors' noneconomic damages were found to be negative and statistically significant. 10 The estimate implies a 4.4 percent reduction in the physician supply when a neighboring state passes a cap on noneconomic damages. 11 As an example, if Indiana were to pass a cap on noneconomic damages, the counties in Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Kentucky that are adjacent to Indiana would see 4 percent declines in their stocks of physicians.
As mentioned previously, the Congressional Budget Office's review of studies found that only noneconomic damages are consistently related to medical malpractice liability (Congressional Budget Office 2004) . I find the same result here. Caps on total damages might be expected to be more effective than a cap on noneconomic damages (the raw point estimates imply as much), but I have very little statistical precision; only five states passed caps on total damages and only one of them was overturned (North Dakota's). So with only 6 law changes, the estimate on total damages is less reliable than that on noneconomic damages that comes from more than 42 law changes. It is less clear whether I would expect neighbors' caps on punitive damages to matter. As mentioned previously, Helland et al.
(2011) suggests it is unclear whether the liability pressure physicians face after a punitive damages cap is implemented increases or decreases. Additionally, Eisenberg, Goerdt, Ostrom, Rottman and Wells (1997) provide evidence that punitive damages are rarely awarded in medical malpractice jury trials.
The estimated effects of neighbors' reforms in (1) imply that physicians prefer to practice in states with reforms. In column (2), I include measures for a state's own reform status. To the extent that these reforms are endogenous and correlated with outcomes and neighbors' reforms, they will bias the estimates of neighboring state's reforms. However, the results change very little from the first column to the second. The coefficients on state's own reforms tend to be small in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The exception is punitive damages caps. The two endogeneity stories discussed previously, that states may be passing reforms when their supply of physicians is falling or that they pass reforms as they are moving towards managed care, both suggest a downward bias in own-state reforms.
In addition, it is possible that punitive damages caps actually increase physicians' liability (Helland et al. 2011) .
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If it is true that physicians relocate their practice to neighboring states when those neighbors pass reforms, there are a number of intuitive predictions. For example, if a county has a large population relative to neighboring counties, the effect of the neighboring state's reform is going to be smaller than the average effect. The pair of columns in Table 3 Because a neighbor's noneconomic damages cap was the only reform found to be statistically significant in the basic specification, I focus attention on it here. The main effect is similar to the initial specification, changing from -0.044 to -0.040; the interaction effect is 0.012, though imprecisely estimated. The interaction implies that if I were to add fifty thousand residents to the average county whose neighbor had a noneconomic damages cap in place, the effect of the cap would go from a 3.9 percent decline in the physician population to a 3.4 percent decline.
As a county's land area increases, the average distance a physician would have to travel to practice in the neighboring state increases. This suggests that the impact of neighbors' reforms will decrease with county size. In the columns labeled (4) in Table 3 (Kessler and McClellan 1996 , Kessler and McClellan 2002b , Kessler and McClellan 2002a , Kessler et al. 2005 . None of these studies have reported the coefficient for punitive damages separately, so it is difficult to ascertain whether my result is anomalous or not.
0.085).
The potential sources of endogeneity in the reforms discussed previously imply that a state's own reforms could be related to underlying trends in its population of physicians.
Is it also plausible that there are underlying trends in the stock of physicians reflected in neighbors' malpractice reform status? To test whether there were any pretrends, I include a set of variables for each reform that indicate whether a county's neighbor was going to pass that reform the following year, in two years, and so on up to four years in the future. If neighbors' reforms reflect changes in the stock of physicians instead of causing it, we should find statistically significant effects on many of the pre-reform indicators. Table 4 shows that there is very little evidence for pretrends that might suggest neighbors' reforms are reflecting trends instead of causing actual reductions in the supply of physicians to counties across the state border. Out of the twenty pre-reform indicators, only one is statistically distinguishable from zero. Table 5 presents results from two more robustness checks. The first tests the effects of neighboring states reforms on counties adjacent to border counties and the second tests whether neighbors' reforms are simply picking up migration trends in the overall population.
Because the identification strategy uses counties that border other states, there is a natural robustness test using a subset of the interior counties. Instead of using counties that are directly adjacent to another state, I use counties that are adjacent to counties that border another state. I assign the reform status of border counties to these "near-border" counties.
In Figure 2 , Lee County Illinois is adjacent to Whiteside County which is in turn adjacent to Iowa. The test assigns Whiteside County's X variables to the Lee County. When a nearborder county is adjacent to multiple border counties, I use population weighted averages of the border counties' Xs. This specification will identify if there is still a distance gradient among the near-border counties. As seen in Table 5 , the estimated coefficients on neighbors' reforms tend to be closer to zero than their counterparts in the baseline specification. If the premise of the identification strategy is true, one would expect that the estimates on the effects of neighbors' reforms will be smaller for these interior counties because of the greater geographical distance from the reforming state. This is born out in the data.
One might be concerned that the neighbors' reform variables are just picking up movements in the general population. To test this hypothesis, I regress the log of the population in a county against neighbors' reform status and the list of covariates.
13 If this story were true, then I should find that neighbors' reforms have the same effect on population as they do on the population of physicians. The results from this regression are displayed in the second column of Table 5 . None of the variables for neighbors' reforms are statistically related to movements in the general population and the point estimates tend to point in the wrong direction. For instance, even if the 0.005 point estimate on a neighbor's noneconomic damages cap were true, it would imply that people are coming to the county at the same time that doctors are leaving.
Adverse Selection Empirical Strategy
Ideally, malpractice events would be observable at the individual level. However, those data do not exist for a national analysis. Instead, I use the number of paid malpractice claims per doctor in a given state and year. Note that I do not assume that a malpractice claim implies an actual instance of malpractice by a physician. I use only malpractice claims that received payment.
14 As mentioned in Section 2, the measure of paid malpractice claims is only available at the state level. This necessitates that the adverse selection analysis be conducted at that level. I use the same basic strategy that was used in the migration analysis: examine the effect of a neighbor's reform, not a state's own reform. In particular, I study what I refer to as the malpractice rate, the number of paid claims in a state divided by the number of 13 The log of the population is then excluded from the set of observable covariates. 14 Calculations laid out in Appendix B imply that the probability of malpractice conditional on the claim being paid is 0.80. physicians in that state. As seen in Table 6 , on average, there were about 2.5 paid claims per 100 doctors in the sample.
It would be problematic to analyze the malpractice rate in a state before and after that state passes reforms. In addition to the standard endogeneity concern, there are effects in the legal market and changes in the incentives physicians face. In the legal market, the reforms make it less profitable to file a claim. Since not all instances of medical malpractice are brought as claims (e.g. Brennan, Leape, Laird, Hebert, Localio, Lawthers, Newhouse, Weiler and Hiatt 1991, Leape, Brennan, Laird, Lawthers, Localio, Barnes, Hebert, Newhouse, Hiatt 1991, White 1994) , the fraction of malpractice events that turn into claims should drop. This in turn implies that the number of claims per doctor will fall. This is particularly noteworthy because it implies that an estimated impact of a state's own reforms will not necessarily be of similar magnitude, but opposite in sign, of a neighbor's reforms:
The neighbor's reform does not change patients' incentives to file claims, but a state's own reform does. In addition, for physicians, the costs of harming patients generally decreases when reforms are passed. Since not harming patients is costly, the decrease in the expected costs of harming patients will likely lead to an increase in malpractice. This should in turn lead to an increase in claims per doctor. These two forces push in opposite directions and make the effects of a state's own reforms on malpractice rates ambiguous.
The proposed identification strategy is able to sidestep the problems just mentioned. For example, when Indiana passes a medical malpractice reform, I study the malpractice rate in Illinois. In this case, I do not have to worry about changes in incentives that doctors and lawyers face in Illinois because the legal malpractice environment in Illinois has not changed.
All that has changed is the composition of physicians in Illinois, allowing us to interpret changes in the malpractice rate as representing the change in average quality of physicians in Illinois. As seen in Table 6 , in the average state and year, approximately 39 percent of a state's neighbors had a noneconomic damages cap in place.
My estimating equation is
where i indexes the state, t indexes the year, X is a vector of variables indicating the reform status of the neighboring states, C is a vector of control variables, λ t is a set of year fixed effects, λ s is a set of state fixed effects, and ρ st is a set of state specific linear time trends. The set of control variables used in the migration analysis as well as controls for the fraction of physicians who are general practitioners, surgeons, or other specialties are used in equation (2), but aggregated up to the state level. Basic summary statistics for these latter variables are presented in cluster by own state but acknowledge there may be some remaining correlation in the error terms that bias the standard errors.
Note that only one state, South Dakota, passed a cap on total damages in the limited time frame available in the NPDB. As such, the estimated impact of that reform should be viewed with considerable caution.
Adverse Selection Results
Evidence of adverse selection will come in the form of neighbors' reforms having negative effects on the malpractice rate in a state. If the malpractice rate in a state declines when neighbors pass reforms, that implies that physicians with high malpractice rates left. The opposite case holds for positive selection. One might think that when a state's neighbors pass malpractice reforms and physicians leave, the price of medical services goes up which leads to a decrease in the quantity consumed. In this scenario, the number of patient visits per doctor in the non-reform state might decrease. Then even without a change in the quality of physicians, the number of malpractice claims per doctor could decrease. Column (3) reports results from equation (2) in which the total expenditures on physicians in the state is held constant. While not ideal, the state level Medicare and Medicaid expenditure data go some distance toward controlling for changes in the consumption of physician services. The estimated effects are extremely similar to those in column (1), the baseline specification.
Thus far, a state's own reforms have been omitted from the regression equation due to concerns that they are endogenous. They are included in the specification reported in column (4) of Table 7 . The estimated impact of noneconomic damages falls very slightly in magnitude, but remains statistically distinguishable from zero at conventional levels. For the most part, the estimated impacts of neighbors' reforms are very similar to the previous estimates.
As mentioned in Section 5, own state reforms are separately identifiable from neighboring states' reforms because 47 of the 48 contiguous states have more than 1 neighboring state (Maine is the exception).
It is difficult to interpret the estimated coefficients on a state's own reforms presented in column (4). As mentioned previously, it is not obvious that they should be opposite in sign and of similar magnitude to neighbors' reforms: a state's own reforms reduce the incentives to file malpractice claims. This could explain the negative coefficient observed on state's own noneconomic damages cap. The effects on the legal market are not present in the estimates of a neighbor's reform and so will tend to push own-state reforms to be negative like neighbors' reforms. As mentioned in section 5, only one state passed a cap on total damages between 1990 and 2002. Thus the estimated impact of a cap on total damages is based on a single observation and should be treated with skepticism.
Malpractice claims can take a long time to be resolved; the average claim takes five years to be resolved . Thus far, I have used data from malpractice claims paid no later than 2002 and state specific time trends to try to avoid effects of the long tail of claims. In principle, if the duration of malpractice claims that take a long time to resolve are unaffected by neighbors' reforms status, my results will be unaffected by the long tail.
However, to test whether the malpractice cases that take a very long time to be resolved affect my results, I can restrict the sample to malpractice events that occurred in the first two-thirds of my sample, between 1990 and 1998. Since the NPDB data are from June 30,
2008, my restricted sample includes all paid malpractice claims that were resolved within 9.5 years of being filed. When I restrict the sample in this way, I find a slightly stronger effect of neighbors' noneconomic damages caps, but the point estimate is not statistically distinguishable from my previous estimates. None of the other reforms are found to be statistically significant. These results imply that the long tail of malpractice claims is not biasing my results.
I also assess the importance of including the state-specific trends. For the full sample up to 2002, omitting the state-specific trends does push the point estimates towards zero as suggested in Section 5 (for noneconomic damage caps, the point estimate is -0.04). However, another way to examine the impact of differing claim processing speeds across states is to restrict the sample to 1998 or earlier and omit the state-specific trends. The idea is that by limiting the sample to the very early years, the number of unresolved claims generated by events that took place before 1998 is very small and so the malpractice rates will be good measures of true malpractce. For this sample, omitting state specific trends leads to a point estimate of -0.218 for noneconomic damages caps. This is very similar to our estimate for the full sample that includes state-specific linear trends (column (3) of Table 7 ). In addition, adding in state-specific higher order trends produces estimates extremely similar in magnitude to those that use simple state-specific linear trends and the full sample of data.
For a fourth order polynomial, the coefficient on noneconomic damages caps is -0.18; for a fifth order polynomial, it is -0.21.
It is not obvious that a neighbor's malpractice reform affects a state more than a nonneighboring state's reform. For example, people in Southern California are probably just as affected by Washington state's reforms as they are by Oregon's. This line of thinking implies that states that have a greater land area will see smaller effects of reforms than states with a smaller land area. In the columns labeled (4) in Table 7 , I report results from a regression where neighbors' reforms have been interacted with how many square miles are in a state (measured in 10,000s of square miles). The direct effect of neighbors' caps on noneconomic damages is still negative and statistically significant. The interaction term for noneconomic damages suggests that as a state becomes larger, the effect of a neighbor's reform falls. For instance, if a state were to increase in size by 10,000 square miles, the marginal effect of a neighbor's reform would fall by approximately 2 percent.
Discussion
This paper examines whether medical malpractice reforms affect where physicians practice and whether the physicians who relocate in response to reforms are more or less likely to commit malpractice. I employ an identification strategy that disentangles the impact of adverse selection from those of moral hazard and changes in the incentives to file malpractice claims. I use the same identification strategy to test whether physicians do in fact relocate in response to reforms. My estimates suggest that physicians do relocate and that those who do are more likely to commit malpractice than physicians who do not move in response to malpractice reforms. I intepret this as evidence of adverse selection.
But even if the physicians who relocate are prone to malpractice, does it matter? The Harvard Medical Practice Study estimated that out of 2.6 million hospital discharges, there were 6,895 deaths due to medical malpractice in New York in 1984 (Brennan et al. 1991) . First column presents summary statistics for counties with a neighbor that will pass at least one reform in the following year. The second column gives means for the corresponding reforming counties in the year prior to reform. The last column presents the p-value for the difference of the two means. 
Dependent variable is log physician-to-population ratio. Data from 1970 Data from to 2001 Data from except 1984 Data from , 1987 Data from , and 1991 
and bias(β|X) = (X X) −1 Cov(neighref, npress)γ 2 + (X X) −1 Cov(neighref, opress)γ 1 .
Because there is nothing inherently different about own and neighboring counties, it should be true that Cov(neighref, npress) = Cov(ownref, opress) and Cov(neighref, opress)
= Cov(ownref, npress). Then let Z ≡ Cov(ownref, opress) and W ≡ Cov(ownref, npress).
In that case, bias(α −β|X) = (γ 1 − γ 2 )(Z − W ).
As mentioned previously, γ 1 < γ 2 which implies that γ 1 − γ 2 < 0. Then as long as a state's own reforms are more positively associated with the state's malpractice pressure than its neighbors' malpractice pressure, (γ 1 − γ 2 )(Z − W ) < 0 or |bias(α)| > |bias(β)|. Intuitively, the bias in the own-state reforms will be greater in magnitude than that in the neighboring states' reform variable because the malpractice pressure and reforms in a state have bigger impacts on a state's own physician supply than a neighbor's physician supply.
For the effect of neighbors' reforms to be estimated without bias, we need two conditions to be true. First, the malpractice pressure in a neighboring state should have no direct impact on the supply of physicians in state s over and above the impact of neighbors' reforms (γ 2 = 0). Second, a state's own malpractice pressure needs to not vary with each neighbor's reform status (Cov(neighref, opress) = 0).
As seen in the estimation results, there is not a strong correlation between states' own reform status and neighbors' reforms. Then Cov(neighref, ownref ) ≈ 0 which in turn suggests that Cov(neighref, opress) ≈ 0 because a state's malpractice pressure impacts its reform status. This implies that the second assumption is approximately true.
The first assumption can not be tested directly because malpractice pressure is not observable. Thus, to claim that my estimated impacts of neighbors' reforms are unbiased, I must maintain that the only impact a neighboring state's malpractice pressure has on another state is through its reform status. Although this may not be true, my empirical strategy almost certainly provides less biased estimates of the impact of tort reforms on physician supply than using a state's own reforms (from equation (7)).
B Relationship Between Paid Claims and Actual Malpractice
There have been a number of studies that sought to understand the relationship between actual malpractice occurrences, malpractice claims, and malpractice payments conditional on a malpractice claim being filed. Farber and White (1991), Studdert et al. (2006) , and Taragin, Willett, Wilczek, Trout and Carson (1992) each constructed samples of malpractice claims and estimated the probability of payment conditional on filing a claim and on the quality of care received by the claimant. These studies found that the probability of payment conditional on receiving care not classified as negligent was approximately 25 percent while the probability of payment conditional on receiving care classified as negligent was approximately 80 percent. This latter figure comes from the following calculation. From (White 1994) , P r(claim paid | negligence, claim filed) ≈ 0.80 and P r(negligence | claim filed) ≈ 0.40. This implies that P r(claim paid & negligence | claim filed) ≈ 0.32. Since the probability a malpractice claim receives payment is 0.40 or less, a lower bound on P r(negligence | claim paid, claim filed) is 0.80.
